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1.  Introduction 
In the late 1990s, the concept of sub-national (regional and metropolitan) innovation 
system, which derived from the national innovation system literature, takes institutional and 
organizational dimension in the territorial level into consideration of innovation activities 
(Cooke et al., 1997, Howells, 1999, Cooke, 2001, Diez, 2002, Morgan, 2004, Asheim and 
Coenen, 2005). The theoretical discussion of territorial innovation system adopts an 
evolutionary view towards the casual relationship between territorial assets and innovation in 
the development process. The highest level of territorial production system lies in the shaping 
of innovation dynamics in which the local actors gradually develop the capacity and strategy 
to grasp the cumulative and socialized knowledge not only to foster learning and innovation, 
but also to turn it into profit (Porter, 1990, Cooke et al., 1997, Cooke and Morgan, 1998, 
Capello, 1999). Moreover, the institutional setup, which is context-specific and 
path-dependent, impacts on the way of interaction and learning between economic actors as 
the specialized cluster evolves (Revilla Diez, 2009). 
When this line of thinking applies to empirical investigation, however, a stylist approach 
such as benchmarking is usually adopted. This is partly due to the mature innovation 
institutions in these areas such as Europe and North America, where the institutional setup 
tend to be static. In China, the transition from planned economy to market economy proceeds 
gradually which results in the constant adjustment of institutional setup responding to the 
need of rapid industrialization and restructuring stimulated by integration into the global 
economy. Moreover, public sector in China plays important role in organizing and 
coordinating economic activities in the way of financial arrangements, incentive provision 
and gain distribution scheme. This specific context provides the opportunity to gain insight 
into the impact of evolving institutional setup on innovation.   
In this paper, we aim to shed light on how innovation is fostered under different 
institutional setup by comparing the institutional setups and their corresponding innovation 
dynamics in Shenzhen and Dongguan, China. Since the opening in late 1970s, the central   2
government either directly involved in economic development such as establishing economic 
special zones, or implicitly encouraged the bottom-up development mainly by releasing more 
economic developmental autonomy to local governments. In Shenzhen, the institutional setup 
is characterized by a state-oriented involvement of economic development with ex-ante 
strategic policy support. While in Dongugan, institutional setup is characterized by flexible 
and informal institutions organized mainly by town and village authorities that are favorable 
for overseas Chinese investment based on Guanxi (Leung, 1993, Yang, 2010).   
Until 2000, high agglomeration of electronics industry has been developed in Pearl River 
Delta, especially in Shenzhen and Dongguan thanks to the opportunities of global industrial 
shift and reorganization. However, the different institutional set-up in these two cities would 
lead to different mechanism of innovation. After decades of rapid development relied on 
low-end export-oriented production, Shenzhen and Dongguan all encountered with the issue 
of restructuring from the low-value added production to high-value added activities such as 
innovation. Fu and Diez (2010) demonstrate the external knowledge spillover from FDI and 
import already trigger local knowledge spillover within the industries in Pearl River Delta. In 
this turning point, it is worthwhile to investigate the impact of institutional setup and its 
evolution in shaping the effective and sustainable innovation mechanism as well as the 
prospect of upgrading and restructuring. 
Drawing upon the institution focused view of territorial innovation system, this paper 
argues that the institutions organized from bottom up targeting at attracting process trade, 
which has taken shape since opening in Dongguan, restricts the scope of interaction and 
learning related to innovation and would probably lock-in the city in low-end production 
activities if the existing institutional setup can not be broken up. On the other hand, 
institutional setup favoring the agglomeration of knowledge-related and knowledge-intensive 
institutes and ex-ante strategic support organized from top down in Shenzhen contributes to 
the reciprocal and systematic interaction between firms as well as knowledge institutes.   
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The second section elucidates scales of 
institutional setup in making up territorial innovation system and how the evolving manner of 
institution shapes the innovation strategy and capacity. In the discussion, different institutional 
setups, for instance, the bottom-up and top-down ways to boost industrialization in the 
context of transitional China would be discussed. Afterwards, the data and method to explore 
the impact of institutional setup in these two cities on innovation mechanism would be   3
covered in the third section. The fourth section depicts the developmental path of electronics 
industry in Shenzhen and Dongguan under different institutional setup. Econometric results 
would be discussed in align with the theoretical discussion on institutional setup and 
innovation in the fifth section. Finally, the paper discusses the applicability of the results and 
further discusses the policy implication.   
2.  Top-down and Bottom-up Institutional Set up and Innovation: Two Hypotheses 
To secure systematic learning and innovation synergies that occurs externally to the firm 
boundary, institutions play important role in providing access to information, ensuring 
credibility, coordinating collective actions and even creating learning atmosphere (Dalum et 
al., 1992, Sweeney, 1995, Amin, 1999, Haggard, 2004). In this way, innovation is carried out 
through a network of various actors underpinned by a specific institutional setup, and the 
evolution of institutional structures make up the system of innovation (Howells, 1999). 
In Cooke et al. (1997)’s seminal work on bringing regional-level institutions instead of 
national level ones first into the consideration of innovation activities, three determining 
elements of institutions has been investigated (Table 1): 1) financial and budgetary capacity of 
public institutions to mobilize innovation-related resources; 2) Supported infrastructure to 
sustain externalized learning atmosphere; 3) Institutional competence to grasp new 
opportunities and avoid strong lock-in effect.   
Table 1 Aspects of innovation supported capacities in territorial level 
Accessibility for firms to capital market   
Capacity to impose taxes 
Autonomy for public spending 
High level of financial intermediaries 
Financing & 
Budget 
Control over public procurement 
Density and quality of infrastructures for innovation   
Control or shared execution of part of strategic infrastructures 
Own educational and training system 
University related to the area 
Supported 
infrastructure 
Research laboratories in the area 
Capacity to design and execute industrial and technological policies   
Development of information and promotion policies  Institutional 
competence 
(local, regional, …) science and technology programme 
Adjusted from Cooke et al. (1997) 
In China, the bottom-up and top-down way of development in China after opening policy 
is fundamental in gaining insight into the distribution of these three aspects among different 
territorial level. After the success of rural household contract responsibility system reform in   4
1978, a political consensus has been reached concerned on carrying out this developing 
concept further to wider scope. It was expected to arouse the enthusiasm of economic 
development by setting general economic goals and transferring the fiscal autonomy to lower 
level authorities, including imposing taxes and disposing of fiscal income where the exact 
proportion is negotiated between the higher level governments and lower level governments 
based on the performance in the last financial period.   
Under the institutional arrangements of fiscal decentralization, a bottom up development 
approach has been widely spread out in coastal China, especially in formerly less 
industrialized rural areas. Almost two thirds of FDI investing in China in 1990 was going to 
non-large cities such as prefecture-level municipalities such as Dongguan and Suzhou 
(Airriess, 2008). Growth under this bottom-up institutional setup arose widely in small towns 
and vast countryside of Southern China and eastern Coast (Lin, 1997).   
Meanwhile, the top-down institutional setup still plays important role in providing 
financial support and initiating industrial policies in China especially for strategically selected 
regions and industries. Besides, the supply of scarce knowledge-related and 
knowledge-intensive institutes is often limited within the national level. Central government 
policy oriented cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen enjoy great accessibility to 
these innovation supported infrastructures.   
The institutional setups of bottom-up and top-down approach have been illustrated by 
similar visions on types of regional innovation system from the perspective of governance 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998, Asheim and Coenen, 2005, Revilla Diez, 2009), i.e., the grassroots, 
network and dirigiste type of RIS. These three types differ in the way of degree of policy 
intervention as well as the relationship with knowledge-related organizations in different 
scales. Although this classification does not make explicit formulation on bottom-up and 
top-down approach, the relationship between policy support and innovation has been touched. 
Ex-post support which is more hands-on and industry-specific is oriented towards incremental 
problem solving, while ex-ante support is able to counter technological and cognitive lock-in 
(Asheim and Coenen, 2005).   
In our analysis, institutional setup refers to the approach to initiate, organize and govern 
cluster development, which in an evolutionary way affects the rules of interaction and the 
collective learning process in the system of innovation (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 
2005).   5
The ways to initiate the cluster development shape the knowledge base of a place, 
determining the absorptive capacity of firms and other innovation related organizations. 
Absorptive capacity of innovation system as a whole impacts the effectiveness of interaction 
and learning among firms, making up the capacity of innovation agents to process the new 
and related information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Gambardella, 1992, Tripsas, 1997, Zahra 
and George, 2002). This aspect is of great relevance in transition economy, as strongly 
institutionalized activities such as central command determines the distribution and density of 
knowledge-related institutes and organizations. In this manner, top-down approach 
outperforms bottom-up approach when advanced knowledge was generated and distributed 
within the framework of national innovation system. In sum, institutional setup that initiates 
development with better endowment of knowledge base bears wider scope and scale of 
organizational interaction and ensures higher efficiency of the innovation-oriented interaction 
when combined with more intensive internal information processing activities.   
On the other hand, institutions, which are embedded in rules, norms and related operated 
organizations, act as the organizers and coordinators of economic activities, shaping the 
interacting way between the actors through various formal and informal arrangements (Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998, Edquist, 1997, Dosi, 1988). As postulated by Jepperson and Meyer (1991), 
institutions are stable designs for chronically repeated activity sequence. Therefore, 
institutional setup bears the characteristic path dependency, cumulative causation and lock-in 
in terms of context specificity (Hodgson, 1994).   
There are two reasons for lock in effect. Firstly, “competency trap” might arise as being 
too good at something constrains the capacity to absorb new ideas and develop new trajectory 
(Levitt and March, 1988). In a broader sense, the locked-in competency refers to the 
competency of individual organizations to make specific achievements as well as the 
competency of institutions such as laws and norms to manipulate the relationships between 
various organizations so to achieve effective interactions and results. Secondly, vested 
interests in organizations emerge in the formation process of institutional setup, which might 
oppose the changes that undermines their current gains and positions (Boschma, 2004). This 
aspect is witnessed by the decline of heavily industrialized areas in Britain and Germany in 
late industrializing time. All together, it constitutes “cognitively sunk cost” that create 
negative reinforcing cycling, impeding new development dynamics and trajectory 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992).   6
In the transition economy, the bottom-up approach evolves gradually within the constrain 
of previous institutions, while the top-down approach is able to start with blank sheet or tear 
up old institutional setup (Easterly, 2008). The capability of top-down approach in bringing 
new dynamics into the economy is well reflected by the technology foresight. According to 
the practices in some countries such as Japan, Britain, Australia and New Zealand (Martin and 
Johnston, 1999), technology foresight, which is mostly conducted by government agency or 
advisory board with more responsibilities, generates concentration on long-term development 
on selected trajectories and develop a level of consensus on desirable futures. Technology 
foresight includes the practice of selecting technology priorities, identifying new strategic 
industries, creating partnership between sciences, industry and government as well as 
providing incentives for multidisciplinary research. Therefore, the top-down approach, which 
is mostly initiated and governed by national level agency with more power in the context of 
transition economy such as in China, is more able to draw technology foresight to inject new 
dynamics into development than bottom-up approach.   
The bottom-up approach, which evolves from the pre-existing institutions, suffers more 
from negative lock-in than top-down approach as competency trap and vested interests are 
hard to be broke through without dynamics injecting by higher level authorities. In China, the 
incipient industrialization was mostly organized by the township and village enterprise in the 
basic level due to the small scale foreign investment in the beginning fearing the uncertainty 
of institutional reform in China. Because the earnings made by township and village 
enterprises were then the main source of fiscal income, they became the main recipient of 
infrastructure supply and policy incentive in the town and village level. Indeed, the town and 
village governments have been the primary Chinese-side stock holders on industrialization by 
providing cheap collectively owned land to foreign investors that posses equipment and 
capital. Moreover, the distribution of the processing earning is negotiated between the town 
and village governments and foreign investors, mostly under informal framework such as oral 
agreements. In this way, vested interests are taken shape among foreign firms, basic level 
authorities and related organizations within the framework of evolving institutional setup.   
To sum up, institutional setup with more complex vest interests and less dynamics from 
outside runs the risk of negative lock-in. When the lock-in effect emerges in face of 
restructuring and upgrading, it would create systemic market and policy barriers to other 
development alternatives (Könnölä    et al., 2006). In an innovation system that lacks renewal   7
dynamics, knowledge is often accumulated and repeatedly sustained through previous 
experience and learning by doing within a limited scope of network. Therefore, tacit 
knowledge is more important in promoting incremental innovation than in economies with 
more dynamics and absorptive capacity to search for new sources of innovation. Saviotti 
(1998) refers the search activities to “learning by not doing”, in which external environment is 
understood in a comparing manner between its component elements as well as with the 
internal routine and capability. The ability to learn by not doing can be strengthened with the 
capacity to understand wider range of codified knowledge such as technical literature not 
limited to local level.   
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that different scales of institutional setup 
and their evolving manner impact on how innovation is fostered in the local scale, which is 
attributed to knowledge base of main players and embeddedness of rules and norms that 
defines the interacting ways of innovation actors. Drawing on this basic argument, two 
hypotheses can be drawn: 
Hypothesis 1: Bottom-up institutional setup that is highly embedded in local clusters 
might lead to systematic market and policy barrier to new actors. It would restrict the scope of 
interaction and learning related to innovation, leading to the reliance on the transfer of tacit 
knowledge from limited actors to foster innovation. 
Hypothesis 2: Top-down institutional setup is able to draw technology foresight by means 
of introducing new related industries and integrating resources. This practice, combining with 
market economy transition and global demand pull, is able to avoid negative lock-in in 
technological development. Moreover, top-down institutional setup in transition economy can 
add up the knowledge base of a place and enhances the absorptive capacity of the innovation 
actors, which trigger interactive learning and systematic innovation.   
3.  Data and Methodology 
In order to test the hypotheses, a sample of electronics firms in Shenzhen and Dongguan, 
China was used. We focus the investigation on electronics industry due to its great dominance 
and development history in the research area that enables the inquiry into innovation in the 
face of restructuring and upgrading. As shown in Figure 1, the output value of electronics 
industry in Shenzhen and Dongguan kept growing during the period of 1994 and 2009. 
Dongguan, which is known for “world factory of electronics”, experienced much lower level   8















Figure 1 Output Value of Electronics Industry during 1994-2009 
The institutional setups in Shenzhen and Dongguan, which evolve since opening to meet 
the need of rapid industrialization, correspond respectively to the top-down and bottom-up 
scenarios since opening in China. In our analysis, the scenarios and evolution process of 
different institutional setups would be depicted by reviewing on “Shenzhen Electronics 
Yearbook” and “Guangdong Electronics Yearbook”.   
In the next step, a questionnaire data of electronics firms in these two cities would be 
employed to investigate on the factors that foster innovation outcomes. The questionnaire 
survey is conducted via telephone and posting in order to ensure the feasibility of the survey 
and validity of the data, and is strengthened by a follow-up process, which aims at persuading 
the firms to fill and send back the questionnaires as well as filling unanswered questions after 
the questionnaires return.. In order to get contact with more firms, we applied the second 
method: fair visiting. We randomly select the fairs and the firms there to distribute the 
questionnaires. Moreover, the fairs we visited have large number of firm exhibitors that it 
ensures the unbiased of the fair visiting result. Finally, we got 167 firms in Shenzhen and 177 
firms in Dongguan, and the response rate in Shenzhen and Dongguan is 54% and 63%, 
respectively.  
In the questionnaire, various aspects of external interaction and internal efforts during the 
innovation process such as getting new innovative ideas, acquiring codified knowledge and 
tacit knowledge has been asked according to their importance of application. The scope of 
interaction covers various business partners, such as parent companies, foreign customers,   9
domestic customers, universities and research institutions, and sales agents. Besides, the 
informality of interaction with the partners is identified.   
In our analysis, ordered logit regression is applied due to the discrete and inherently 
ordered multinomial-choice variable, which adds up the subjective evaluation on the degree 
of improvement (ranging from 0 to 5 with increasing significance of change) on product 
function expansion and product category upgrading. Factor analysis is firstly applied to 
reduce the dimensions in order to simplify the following analysis, which is applied in the 
following regression as the main dimension of factors that fostered innovation performance. 
The derived factors are able to explain over 60% of the variance of the original sample In 
order to avoid multicollinearity, seven variables are finally selected as the independent 
variables. Table 2 shows the independent variables including the innovation behaviors in the 
innovation process and the control variables.   
Table 2    Independent variables in Product Innovation Performance Regressions 
 Indicators  Description 
NPI_external partners  Interacting with domestic customers, universities, research 
institutions and sales agents to gain innovation ideas 
NPI_internal efforts  Making internal learning efforts such as own ideas, license 
purchasing and reverse engineering 
NPI_parent comp. & foreign Relying on parent companies or foreign customers to gain 
innovation ideas 
NPTK_active learning  Sending staff to business partners for training 
NPTK_passive from 
customer 
Receiving training and know-how from people sent by 
domestic and foreign customers 
NPTK_passive from parent 
comp. 






Interacting with innovation partners within Guanxi networks 
Size 
Defined according to Chinese firm size standard, 1 as large 
firms with sales over 300 million Yuan, 0 as small and 
medium sized firms with sales below 300 million Yuan 
Ownership  1 as firms with foreign participation (wholly owned or joint 
venture), 0 as firms with 100% domestic participation 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Age  Years since establishment of the firm 
Educational level of technical 
staff  Proportion of technical staff with bachelor degree and above 
Absorptive 
Capacity  Initial technological level of 
main product 
Defined according to International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities, Rev 3, 1 as 
producing low-tech products when starting business, 2 as 
producing medium-tech products when starting business; 3 
as producing high-tech products when starting business 
4.  Institutional Setups in Shenzhen and Dongguan, China: Developmental Path 
of Electronics Industry 
4.1 Institutional Setup in Shenzhen since opening   10
The role of high-tech industry has been in focus in the very beginning of special zone 
development in Shenzhen. Due to its geographical proximity to Hongkong, the electronics 
industry has been developing rapidly relying on processing operation.   
The motor power of the development of Shenzhen electronics industry in 1980s are the 
large firms that were originally important part of national innovation system in the planned 
economy before opening. These companies stemmed from large state-owned companies 
directly under the jurisdiction of state ministries and provinces, renowned universities and 
research institutes and military-related plants that were highly specialized in heavy industry. 
Special financial formulas such as joint venture between large state-owned companies and 
foreign investors are applied. These joint ventures were then able to introduce high-scale 
production line due to disposal of state-owned assents and scale economies of production. 
Moreover, the high endowment of human capital in state-owned companies enables the better 
absorption of “imported” technology that makes full use of technological spillover from 
foreign investment These units played an important role in organizing and nurturing the 
industrial cluster in the very beginning of development.   
Besides joint venture with foreign companies, there were also joint venture between 
domestic state-owned firms, mainly between the firms under jurisdiction of state ministry and 
firms under the jurisdiction of Guangdong province. These joint domestic firms settle on 
network-base strategy of growth drawing upon personal trust and informal agreement among 
managers. Moreover, the ally of these state-own companies was always accompanied by tasks 
of developing a specific leading product technology. Moreover, Shenzhen City Government 
also initiated the direct investment in high-tech companies to nurture new growth opportunity 
and attract high-end foreign investment. 
The inter-firm linkages of production, information and technology have been built with 
the growth of these Chinese firms allying between each other under the state order as well as 
with the foreign firms. In 1986, Shenzhen Electronics Group Company (later as Saige Group) 
was established under the approval of Shenzhen City Government, which unifies 117 
companies among all the 178 companies in Shenzhen on voluntary basis. In 1988, Shenzhen 
Electronics Group Company arranged the construction of the first specialized electronic parts 
supply market in China “Saige Electronics Supply Market”, which is a remarkable milestone 
in organizing the supply chain of electronics industry in Shenzhen. Within this organizational 
arrangement, information and production opportunities is more frequently shared among   11
member companies. In this way, a tacit base of interaction in complex activities such as 
innovation based on shared values and common norms has take form 
The foreign investment in Shenzhen was only experimental at first and does not constitute 
the pulling motor of development in Shenzhen. However, it did bring new management 
concepts to Shenzhen asides from the advanced equipments. Combing with Shenzhen’s 
special background as the experimental field of opening policies, the revolutionary rate of 
institutional reform remained quite high and many private firms upspring from the 
state-owned companies and flourished quickly in 1990s. In fact, the development of 
electronics industry in Shenzhen was triggered by large domestic state-owned firms, but its 
vital growth is sustained by the growing small and medium sized firms. Compared to Beijing 
and Shanghai, where large state-owned companies and multinationals takes the leading role, 
Shenzhen is known for the progressing domestic private economy.   
From the above discussion, it can be drawn that the development of electronics industry in 
Shenzhen is strongly supported by ex ante and planned involvement of state authorities and 
institutes and echoed with trend of the global industrial shift of electronics industry to 
low-cost regions in 1980s (Luthje, 2004).   
4.2 Institutional Setup in Dongguan since opening 
With the devolution of power from the central government to town and village 
government, the local government in Dongguan devoted into economic growth 
enthusiastically and has actually become the “laboratory technician” of the opening policies.   
The industrialization process in Dongguan started in garment and shoe industries during 
1980s. Compensation trade, i.e. processing raw materials on clients' demands, assembling 
parts for the clients and process according to the clients' samples, expanded quickly in many 
villages and towns. The source of orders mostly came from Hongkong. Dongguan local 
government put great focus on encouraging the Hongkong-Dongguanese to invest in 
hometown. In 1981, the office of outward processing and assembly was established to 
organize this important task. Moreover, the village and town government also greatly 
supported the development of compensation trade by offering cheap land, factory buildings 
and favorable policies. Due to the cultural proximity and geographical proximity to 
Hongkong, the rapid growth benefited the Hongkong bosses as well as the local peasants. The 
demonstration effect and the shaping vested interests have further strengthened the focus on   12
compensation trade in Dongguan.   
A new agglomeration of electronics firms, mainly led by Taiwanese firms, has gradually 
taken shape in Dongguan in the middle of 1990s. Until then, a specialized production network 
among small and medium sized electronics firms has already developed in Taiwan organized 
by the brand companies and contract manufacturers. Therefore, the shift attracted by low-cost 
factors to Dongguan was systematically practiced by a cluster of Taiwanese firms with 
complex supplier linkages. Relying on the networked production bought by Taiwanese firms, 
the electronics industrial chain is now complete and integrated in Dongguan with a kitting rate 
more than 95%. In the beginning of 21st century, the compensation trade on electronics in 
Dongguan has reached its peak.   
In the process of industrial development based on massive foreign investment, Dongguan 
province has devoted much of the fiscal revenue into infrastructure construction such factory 
buildings, road, electricity and telecommunication to improve the investment environment. 
Moreover, the government also invested in human capital improvement to enhance the 
absorption of introduced technology. In sum, the role of institutional support is mainly 
directed to industry-specific and hands-on service.   
Therefore, the institutional support for industrial development is rather ex post. The 
investment is mainly organized by the small village and town governments, which lack the 
ability and incentive to undertake far-sighted ex ante developmental arrangements. According 
to our interview with president of electronics association (Interview with Dongguan 
Electronics Association President Ye, 2007), the competition on attracting foreign investment 
among town and village governments were quite fierce at that time, which finally led to the 
spread of electronics firms all over Dongguan. Due to the village-based industrial 
development, the land use efficiency in Dongguan is quite low and it is difficult to integrate 
the land to form a spatial agglomeration where the firms are able to interact with each other 
frequently. Instead, the interaction between Dongguan electronics firms is mainly sustained by 
supplier linkage, which makes tacit knowledge extremely important in fostering incremental 
innovation.  
The reform of power devolution to basic level governments has greatly mobilized the 
initiative of local governments to develop economy and it was cost efficient at the transition 
time. However, the industrial base of Dongguan was almost nothing before the rapid growth. 
Thereby, the local skilled labor market and related industrial institutions underdeveloped   13
especially in face of great profit made too rapidly by compensation trade. Until 2009, there 
are only 1487 domestic private companies in Dongguan, which takes only 25% of the whole 
economy, and the percentage of private economy in industrial output and value-added is even 
lower, being 16% and 15% respectively. This less endogenous development path is expected 
to exert impact on the long-run development of regional innovation system in Dongguan.   
To sum up, institutional setup in Dongguan is repeatedly strengthened for the aim of 
processing trade development with the symbiotic gain of the village and town level 
governments, oversees Chinese investors (mainly Hongkong and Taiwan) and local peasant. 
Moreover, the support of institutional organization is rather ex-post to enhance the 
comparative advantage of the existing developmental mode of mass low-end production.   
5.  Econometric Results 
Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables. In our sample, most of the firms 
are small and medium sized (86% and 87% in Shenzhen and Dongguan, respectively). The 
share of domestic firms in Dongguan is less than that in Shenzhen. However, the firm age in 
both cities is much alike both in mean values and variations. Technical staffs possess higher 
absorptive capacity in Shenzhen than that in Dongguan according to the share of above 
bachelor degree technicians. In terms of innovation behaviors, Shenzhen firms resort more to 
external partners in triggering innovative ideas, while Dongguan firms rely more on transfer 
of tacit knowledge and displays higher tendency to use informal relations such friends and 
business partners. Nevertheless, Dongguan firms demonstrate higher intensity of relying on 
internal efforts such as own ideas, license purchase and reverse engineering to get innovative 
ideas, which might be attributed to some extraordinary high values. Moreover, whether the 
internal knowledge production process contributes to innovation performance should be 
further investigated. 
Table  3  Descriptive  Statistics 
Shenzhen Dongguan   
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Size  0.14 0.35 0  1  0.13 0.34  0  1 
Ownership  0.28 0.45 0  1  0.47 0.50  0  1 
Age  10.4 7.6  1  57  12.2 7.1  2  51 
Educational level of technical staff  0.43  0.36 0  1  0.33  0.30  0  1 
Initial technological level of main 
product  1.99 0.63 1  3  1.78 0.64  1  3 
NPI_external partners  0.10  1.05 -2.05 2.53 -0.07 0.96  -2.78  1.69
NPI_internal efforts  0.02  0.89 -2.67 1.68 0.11  1.06  -2.61  7.43  14
NPI_parent comp. & foreign  -0.22 0.87 -1.81 2.22 0.27 1.04  -2.89 2.90
NPTK_active learning  -0.03 1.01 -2.10 2.57 0.06  0.95  -2.19  2.10
NPTK_passive from customer  -0.02 0.94 -1.95 2.08 0.10  1.04  -2.13  2.27
NPTK_passive from parent comp.  -0.04 0.98 -1.38 3.28 0.10  1.02  -1.38  3.21
NPInteraction informal  -0.14 0.95 -2.52 1.60 0.14  1.03  -2.53  1.60
 
Verifying the hypotheses, Shenzhen firms and Dongguan firms differ from each other on 
the factors that foster innovation. Table 4 shows the result of the ordered logit regression on 
product innovation performance. Three models are run as comparison, i.e., whole model 
pooling Shenzhen and Dongguan data, Shenzhen model and Dongguan model. All the models 
fit significantly better than an empty model, which is indicated by the significant level of 
chi-square likelihood ratio. The whole model serves as an intermediate between the Shenzhen 
model and Dongguan model, which reflects the difference between Shenzhen and Dongguan 
better.  
The coefficients in the ordered logit model display the ordered log-odds scale of change to 
higher order by one unit increase in the predictor while other variables are held constant. For 
example, if a Shenzhen firm were to increase the use of local partners including domestic 
customer, universities and research institutes as well as sales agents in the innovation process 
by one intensified degree, the ordered log-odds of making better improvement on innovation 
performance would increase by 0.78 while other variables in the model are held constant.   
Unlike ordinary least square regression, the coefficients in ordered logit regression does 
not show the marginal effect of one single explanatory variable on the response variable. In 
fact, the marginal effect differs in different level of the response variable, which is in our case 
the degree of improvement incurred by innovation efforts.   
Table  4  Ordered  Logit  Regression on innovation performance   
Product Innovation Performance 
Independent variables 
Whole Model  Shenzhen Model Dongguan Model
Educational Level   

























Initial Product  Medium tech  0.36 -0.26  0.35   15
vs. low tech
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Prob > chi2  0.001  0.000  0.015 
Pseudo R2  0.04  0.09  0.06 
Number of Observations  230  107  123 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
2.  Initial product as low tech as the default group, which means low tech as 0, the other as 1; 
3.  T test of whether the overall effect of the categorical variable is statistically significant. 
 
Observing firstly the variables indicating the behaviors in the various stage of product 
innovation process, Shenzhen firms combine its internal absorptive capacity with external 
interaction with other partners to trigger innovation ideas, which finally boosts the innovation 
performance. In the highest level of cluster development, the interactive learning does not 
only contribute to effective knowledge transfer, but also trigger the innovation and thus gain 
new creative resources drawing on the complementary knowledge of actors in the cluster 
(Capello, 1999). This indicates the strategy and capacity of Shenzhen electronics firms to 
capitalize on wider source of knowledge spillover, including domestic customers, sales agents, 
universities and research institutes.   
On the other hand, innovation ideas originating within strict hierarchical organization, i.e., 
instructions from parent companies, boosts innovation performance for Dongguan firms. 
Moreover, technical know-how and experiences from the domestic and foreign customers 
plays important role in fostering innovation. Nevertheless, reliance on parent companies’ 
instruction of tacit knowledge does not significantly improve the innovation performance, 
which indicates a certain degree of maturity of cluster development in Dongguan. Compared 
to the innovation activities in Shenzhen firms, the limited capacity to draw upon wider scope 
of external source to foster innovation reflects the bottleneck of upgrading in Dongguan, 
where innovation mechanism is restricted to the hierarchical order as well as to the transfer of   16
tacit knowledge within supplier linkage.   
What is worth mentioning here is the significantly negative effect of tacit knowledge 
either by actively sending employees to learn technical experience or passively having 
engineers sent by other partner to instruct technical experience. This might be related to the 
loss of technical staff in the process of gaining tacit knowledge. The higher absorptive 
capacity of the technical staff in Shenzhen firms than those in Dongguan enables them to 
absorb the knowledge from other organizations more effectively and identify the opportunity 
with higher salary and position. However, it should be cautiously interpreted because the 
labor mobility among local firms should contribute to effective interactive learning process as 
a whole economy (Arrow, 1962, Almeida and Kogut, 1999). The significantly positive effect 
of technical staff’s educational level for Shenzhen firms again verifies this argument, as firms 
gain spill-in human capital and its carried knowledge while losing others in the process of 
tacit knowledge transfer. Song et al. (2003) further points out that the effect of learning by 
hiring in fostering innovation can be strengthened when hired engineers are assigned for 
exploring technologically distant knowledge rather than reinforcing existing core competence. 
Moreover, the difference in the significance level of control variables confirms the 
hypotheses from the other point. For Shenzhen firms in our sample, older firms tend to have 
higher performance in product innovation. This variable demonstrates the long history of 
capability accumulation related to innovation activities such as in technological development, 
management optimization and market research, which all together contributes to higher 
absorptive capacity and higher effectiveness in bringing out better innovation results. On 
contrary, the insignificant small impact of firm age on innovation performance for Dongguan 
firms indicates the firm strategy and capability is just newly developing around 
innovation-related activities. However, firms producing high tech electronics products when 
started, which indicates higher absorptive capacity, perform significantly better than firms 
producing low tech electronics products when started in Dongguan. In a word, firms in 
Dongguan rely more on the routine accumulated gradually within the firm boundary instead 
of complementary knowledge outside the firm than Shenzhen firms, leading to the lack of 
dynamism and incentive to trigger innovation. 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we take the average score of evaluation on 
the degree of improvement on function expansion and categories upgrading as the dependent 
variable. Due to the censoring of this variable, tobit regression was run. Results are not   17
displayed due to the limited space. The coefficient sign and significance level is consistent 
with that in the ordered logit model, except for the impact of ownership is significantly 
negative in the Dongguan model of tobit regression.   
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Institutionalist perspective towards regional development is characterized by supply-side 
support, which aims at providing supportive resources, securing collective actions and 
establishing the strategic goals (Hausner, 1995). This paper explores the capacity of different 
levels of institutional setup, i.e., the top-down and bottom-up approaches, in accomplishing 
these tasks. By investigating on the context-specific scenarios in two cities in China, which 
corresponds to the two institutional setups since the beginning of industrial development, this 
paper gives insight into how institutional setups shape the innovation behaviors, leading to 
divergent dynamism for regional development and upgrading. It appears that top-down 
institutional setup is more competent in providing innovation-related resources and adjusting 
the developmental path with strategic intervention than the bottom-up one, which all together 
widens the scope of interactive learning and shapes the behavioral rationalities of firms to 
resort more to external complementary knowledge.   
While the newly recognized strand of bottom-up institutional supply supports its 
competency to mobilize the local resources and interdependencies (Amin, 2002), the result 
suggests a rather contrasting pattern, indicating this approach might lead to negative lock-in 
effect in face of restructuring and upgrading by restricting the firms within the repeated and 
narrow path of knowledge accumulation and generation. As institutional setup is subjective to 
context and sensitive to path-dependency, the discussion on the role of institutional setup on 
regional development and innovation should be cautiously interpreted. It should be 
remembered that the two cities in our analysis started the rapid industrialization out of nothing, 
that is to say, with nearly no endowment on local skills and industrial base. In this case, the 
bottom-up approach tends to restrain the scope of development within the disposal of less 
competent local authorities. The “grassroots” industrialization, which grows out of barren 
sand of local endowments, bears the risk of negative lock-in in the need of innovation and 
upgrading. Relocation of Taiwaness PC investment from Dongguan to Suzhou is potent 
verification of this argument, in which local initiatives to foster strategic coupling with global 
lead firms fails in spite of Dongguan’s first-mover advantage (Yang, 2009).     18
On the other hand, the empirical finding on the positive role of top-down institutional 
setup in shaping innovative synergies among the firms and innovation-related agents should 
not be viewed as arguments favoring the central planning way of development in Keynesian 
legacy. In fact, the developmental path of electronics industry in Shenzhen is actively 
integrated within the reorganization of global production network, boosting a plurality of 
autonomous agents with respective strategic goals in the transition economy. In this way, local 
assets and “untraded” norms develop based on the endowments provided by higher-scale 
organizations and the strategic framework encouraging dynamism.   
In the early phase of industrialization, in which little skills and industrial routines exist in 
the local scale, it is concluded from our results that top-down approach outperforms 
bottom-up approach in shaping dynamic and reciprocal innovative synergies with its evolving 
to meet the need of restructuring. However, the bottom-up approach, which greatly mobilized 
the initiative of local governments to develop economy, was cost efficient as the national 
authority had limited resources to initiate top-down institutional approach that supports 
sustainable development throughout the whole country.   
For clusters that developed out of bottom-up institutional setup in early phase of 
industrialization, two lessons can be learned. Firstly, strategic plan of industrial development 
should be carried out in order to avoid negative lock in, timely adjusting the developmental 
path to meet the changing market environment and identifying related new industries. 
Moreover, institutional setup should be accordingly regulated to unfasten the vested interests 
among the groups aiming at contrasting development goals. Secondly, policy focus should be 
put upon enhancing the absorptive capacity of firms and related organizations such as 
attracting high quality human capital and encouraging the accumulation and development of 
technological capabilities in firms.   
With the development of local industrial clusters, experiences of building a sustainable 
territorial innovation system can be further borrowed from Europe and the USA where 
innovation institutions are mature. Even for the Shenzhen case in our analysis, the capacity of 
institutions in forming systematic linkages and interaction among innovation agents is still 
underdeveloped. In Europe, economic agents depend to a significant degree on public 
institutions in fostering innovation activities, while in the USA, the role of private institutions 
such as banks and venture capitals is prominent in organizing systematic learning and 
innovation. Ultimately, if the institutional setup is competent in performing inclusive,   19
monitoring, consultative and networking feature, it is more likely to allow high potential 
regional innovation system.   
The transitional scenarios of institutional setup in China offer the opportunity to study the 
impact of institutional setup on the way that innovation is fostered from an evolutionary 
perspective. In the current literature of territorial innovation system, the empirical evidence on 
the role of institution in innovation lacks the evolutionary view due to the developed and 
mature institutional setup in the regions where the concept of innovation system is originated 
from. This paper takes the step in this aspect and contributes to the understanding of 
systematic innovation process embedded within a broader institutional framework. Along this 
line, it would be useful to explore further the specific elements of institutional setup and their 
co-evolving within different scales in shaping innovation strategy and capacity in a territorial 
innovation system. In addition, context specificity should be fully discussed before 
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